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1 Introduction
This paper nds necessary and su¢ cient conditions for dynamic consistency of Cho-
quet Expected Utility preferences. Schmeidler (1989) proposed Choquet Expected
Utility (henceforth CEU) as a theory of choice under ambiguity. However it also has
other applications, for instance Wu (1999) has used it to model anxiety. Schmeidlers
theory did not involve time. To make it more generally applicable it is desirable
to extend it to an intertemporal model. Multi-period decisions present new prob-
lems. Firstly individuals will receive information as time progresses. It is necessary
to model how they update their beliefs as this information is received. Secondly it
is not clear whether individuals with non-additive beliefs will be dynamically consis-
tent. We consider all updating rules which satisfy a property which we consider to
be reasonable.
In Epstein and LeBreton (1993) and Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) it is shown
that, under some assumptions, dynamic consistency of CEU preferences implies that
beliefs must be additive. However these papers imposed conditions, which required
consistency between di¤erent decision trees. In many economic problems, we only
need to consider decision-making in a single tree, for instance any model based on
an extensive form game. Hence it is not clear what implications the earlier results
have in this context. Sarin and Wakker (1998) show that for a xed decision tree, a
necessary condition for dynamic consistency is that beliefs be additive except at the
nal stage. We provide a partial converse to their result by showing that if beliefs are
represented by a convex capacity, this condition is also su¢ cient. In a recent paper
Hanany & Kilbano¤ (2004) show under alternative axioms how dynamic consistency
can be maintained in a xed decision tree.
It has been argued that non-expected utility preferences are di¢ cult to apply, since
they may be dynamically inconsistent, see for instance Green (1987) or Hammond
(1988). We show that dynamic consistency does not imply beliefs should be additive,
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however it does impose some restrictions. How acceptable these restrictions are would
depend on the context.
2 CEU Preferences and Dynamic Consistency
In this section we introduce CEU preferences and nd conditions for them to be
dynamically consistent. We consider a nite set of states of nature S. The set of
outcomes is a convex set X  Rn. An act is a function from S to X. The set of all
acts is denoted by A(S). In this paper we shall restrict attention to the case where
beliefs are represented by convex capacities.
Denition 2.1 A convex capacity on S is a real-valued function  on the subsets of
S which satises the following properties:,
1. A  B )  (A) 6  (B) ;
2.  (?) = 0;  (S) = 1:
3.  (A) +  (B) 6  (A [B) +  (A \B), for all A;B  S:
Schmeidler (1989) argues that convex capacities represent ambiguity-aversion.
However alternative denitions of ambiguity-aversion due to Epstein (1999) and Ghi-
rardato and Marinacci (2002) have cast doubt on the relationship between convexity
and ambiguity-aversion.
If beliefs are represented by a capacity  on S, the expected utility of a given act
can be found using the Choquet integral.
Notation 2.1 Since S is nite, one can order the utility from a given act a : u
 
a1

>
u
 
a2

> ::: > u
 
ar 1

> u (ar) ; where u
 
a1

; : : : ; u (ar) are the possible utility levels
yielded by action a: Denote by Ak (a) = fs 2 Sj u(a(s)) > u  akg the set of states
that yield a utility at least as high as ak: By convention, let A0(a) = ;:
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Denition 2.2 The Choquet expected utility of u with respect to capacity  is:
Z
u(a(s))d(s) =
rX
k=1
u

ak

[(Ak(a))  (Ak 1(a))]:
Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa (1987) and Sarin and Wakker (1992) provide axioms
for representing preferences by a Choquet integral of utility. Another advantage
of assuming convexity is that it implies that CEU preferences also have an intu-
itive multiple priors representation. If beliefs are represented by a convex capacity,
; there exists a closed convex set C of probability distributions on S; such that:R
u(a(s))d(s) = minp2C Epu(a):1 In addition, we shall assume that the utility func-
tion is continuous.
Assumption 2.1 The utility function u : X ! R is continuous.
Assumption 2.2 (Strong Monotonicity) For two acts a; b 2 A (S) ; if 9s^ 2 S;
such that u(a(s^)) > u(b(s^)) and 8s 2 S; u(a(s)) > u(b(s)) then a  b:
This says that no state is null in the sense that increasing the utility in any state
will lead to a strictly preferred option.2
To apply CEU in an intertemporal context it is necessary to specify how beliefs will
be updated as new information is received. There have been a number of proposals for
updating CEU preferences, see, for instance, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993). Instead
of focusing on a specic rule we prove results for any updating procedure which
satises the following assumption.
Assumption 2.3 Let  be a convex capacity on S and let E be an event. Then if
E denotes the update of  conditional on E; we assume that,  (E) +  (:E) = 1
implies, E(A) = (A \ E)=(E) for A  S:
1This is proved in the Proposition in Schmeidler (1989).
2We do not use the full strength of this assumption. In fact we only need it to apply to the events
C and D in the proof of Theorem 2.1. There may be some null states, provided these events are
non-null.
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The strongest motivation for studying Assumption 2.3 is that it is satised by
the three commonest rules for updating CEU preferences, the Optimistic update,
the Dempster-Shafer update, and the Generalised Bayesian Update, (dened below).
Thus using this assumption enables us to prove results for these three rules simulta-
neously. Assumption 2.3 was motivated by the desire to ensure that the updating rule
agrees with Bayesian updating when there is no ambiguity. Since Bayesian updating
is agreed to be correct for additive beliefs, it seems reasonable that an updating rule
for non-additive beliefs should have this property. If  (E) +  (:E) = 1; Lemma 2.1
(below) implies that  (A) =  (A \ E) +  (A \ :E) : If E is observed  (A \ :E)
is not relevant. Thus it does not seem unreasonable to take  (A \ E) as a measure
of the likelihood of A: Dividing by  (E) is a normalisation. The Dempster-Shafer
update, see Shafer (1976) may be dened as follows.
Denition 2.3 Let  be a capacity on S. The Dempster-Shafer update (henceforth
DS-update) of  conditional on E  S is given by:
E (A) =
((A \ E) [ :E)  (:E)
1  (:E) :
The DS-update has been axiomatised in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993), where it is
shown to be equivalent to a maximum likelihood updating procedure. An alternative
is the Optimistic update dened below.
Denition 2.4 Let  be a capacity on S. If E is observed and A  E; the Optimistic
update of  conditional on E is given by: E (A) =
(A\E)
(E) :
This rule assumes that the worst possible outcome occurred on the complement of
E; hence the term optimistic. The Generalised Bayesian Update (henceforth GBU)
(see Ja¤ray (1992), Fagin and Halpern (1991) and Walley (1991)) is dened as follows.
Denition 2.5 Let  be a capacity on S and let E  S. If E is observed and A  E;
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the GBU of  conditional on E is given by:
E (A) =
 (A)
1   (:E [A) +  (A) :
The GBU can be interpreted as the willingness to pay p for a lottery which pays
1 on A and 0 on EnA and is called o¤ if :E occurs:
1  p on A
 p on E  A
0 on :E
:
From the CEU of this lottery,  (A) (1  p) + [1   (:E [A)] ( p) = 0; one can
compute the price p as the likelihood of event A conditional on the event E obtaining.
The following lemma is provides a key step in the proof of the main result.
Lemma 2.1 Let E = E1; :::; EK be a partition and let  be a convex capacity on S
such that
PK
i=1 (Ei) = 1 then for any B  S; (B) =
PK
i=1 (B \ Ei):
Proof. First consider the case where K = 2: Dene sets C and D by C = (B \ E1)[
E2; D = E1 [ (B \ E2) : By convexity,  (C) >  (B) +  (E2)   (B \ E2) ;  (D) >
 (B) +  (E1)    (B \ E1) and 1 =  (S) >  (C) +  (D)    (B) : Substituting
we obtain 1 >  (B) +  (E2)    (B \ E2) +  (B) +  (E1)    (B \ E1)    (B) =
1+  (B)   (B \ E2)   (B \ E1) or  (B \ E2)+  (B \ E1) >  (B) : However the
opposite inequality follows directly from convexity, which establishes the result in
this case: The general result follows by repeated application of the result for K = 2:
The following Proposition shows that the DS, optimistic and GBU updates agree
with Bayesian updating if a non-ambiguous event is observed.
Proposition 2.1 The DS-rule, the optimistic update and GBU satisfy Assumption
2.3.
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Proof. The result is trivial for the optimistic update. Now consider the DS-rule.
Let E be an event such that  (E)+ (:E) = 1: For A  E; E(A) = (A[:E) (:E)1 (:E) :
Let F = A [ :E: By Lemma 2.1,  (F ) = (F \ E) + (F \ :E) = (A) + (:E):
Hence E(A) =
(A)
(E) :
Now consider the GBU, E(A) = (A)= [1  (:E [A) + (A)] : By Lemma 2.1,
(:E [ A) = (:E) + (A). Hence E(A) = (A)1 (:E) . If  (E) +  (:E) = 1 this
implies E(A) =
(A)
(E) :
Next we shall nd a necessary and su¢ cient condition for CEU preferences to be
dynamically consistent. Let E = hE0; :::; ET i be a ltration Let ET = hET1 ; :::; ETKT i;
let A(ETk ) be the set of acts available after event E
T
k is observed, i.e. A(E
T
k ) is a set
of functions from ETk to X. If E
t 2 Et; dene A(Et) = ET2ET ;ETEtA(ET ) to be
the set of acts available at time t; conditional on event Et being observed.
Assumption 2.4 We assume that the partition ET = hET1 ; :::; ETKT i is non-trivial,
i.e.
ETj  > 2; for 1 6 j 6 KT :
Denition 2.6 We denote CEU preferences conditional on Et 2 Et by Et : They
are dened by: a Et b,
R
u(a(s))dEt(s) >
R
u(b(s))dEt(s):
The individual has to choose an act from a set A(S) of acts available at t = 0: At
time t =  (s)he receives a signal, that tells him/her in which element of the partition
E 2 E the state of nature lies. Beliefs are then updated and the individual has an
opportunity to reconsider his/her decision. If the signal says that the true state of
nature is in E 2 E ; then (s)he may choose any act from A(E).
The individual formulates a complete contingent plan of action at time t = 0.
After the receipt of new information (s)he updates his/her beliefs. A new contingent
plan is formulated for the remaining time periods. Acts are evaluated by a Choquet
integral of utility with respect to the new beliefs. The individual is said to be dy-
namically consistent if (s)he keeps to his/her original plan. Below we formally dene
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dynamic consistency with respect to a given ltration.
Denition 2.7 Preferences are said to be dynamically consistent with respect to a
ltration E ; if whenever  > t; a E b; for all E  Et implies a Et b:
This denition says that if conditional on any piece of information which might
be received, b is not preferred to a then b is initially not preferred to a:
The following lemma establishes that, when restricted to non-ambiguous events,
any updating-rule satisfying Assumption 2.3 is independent of the order in which
information is received.
Lemma 2.2 Let E = hE0; :::; ET i be a ltration and let  be a capacity, such thatP
E2ET (E) = 1: Let Et 2 Et and E 2 E ; where  > t: Then if Assumption 2.3 is
satised EtE = E :
Proof. Consider A  E : By Assumption 2.3, EtE (A) =
Et (A)
Et (E )
=
(A)
(Et)
(E )
(Et)
=
(A)
(E )
= E (A) .
Now we present our main result, which establishes a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for CEU preferences to be dynamically consistent. Beliefs must be additive
between di¤erent members of the nest partition in the ltration. They may however
be non-additive within a member of this partition.
Theorem 2.1 Let E = hE0; :::; ET i be a given ltration on S; which satises As-
sumption 2.4. If a decision-maker has CEU preferences with beliefs represented by a
convex capacity, which satisfy Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 and (s)he uses an updating
rule which satises Assumption 2.3 then the following conditions are equivalent:
1. (s)he will be dynamically consistent with respect to E,
2.
P
E2ET (E) = 1.
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Proof. 1)2 Suppose that the decision-maker is dynamically consistent.
Consider rst the case K = 2: Since the partition is non-trivial, we may nd events,
A;B;C; and D such that, E1 = A [ B; E2 = C [ D; where A \ B = C \ D = ?:
Consider acts a; b; c; d; e and f as described in the following table:
E1 E2
A B C D
a 1 1 1 1
b 1 1  0
c 0 0 1 1
d 0 0  0
e   1 1
f    0
We can ensure that acts with these values exist by appropriately normalising
the utility function. Note that
R
adE1 =
R
bdE1 ;
R
cdE1 =
R
ddE1 ;
R
edE1 =R
fdE1 ;
R
adE2 =
R
cdE2 =
R
edE2 and
R
bdE2 =
R
ddE2 =
R
fdE2 : By
continuity and strong monotonicity we may choose  > 1 so that
R
adE2 =
R
bdE2 :
Dynamic consistency then implies that a  b; c  d and e  f: By evaluating the
Choquet integrals we nd: 1 = (   1)  (C) +  (E1 [ C) ;  (E2) =  (C) and
 (E1 [ C) =  (E1) + 1   (E1) : These equations imply  (E1) +  (E2) = 1:
The general case can be established as follows. If
P
E2ET (E) < 1; then we can
apply the above argument to F1 = E1 and F2 =
[
E2ET ;E 6=E1
to deduce that dynamic
consistency implies  (F1) +  (F2) = 1; which is a contradiction.
2)1 Now suppose that at time t^ event E^ is observed and at time  > t^; a < ~E b, for
all ~E 2 E ; ~E  E^: Let V

aj ~E

=
R
u (a) d ~E denote the (Choquet) expected utility
of a conditional on ~E: By hypothesis and Assumption 2.3,  ~E

Ai \ ~E

=
E^(Ai\ ~E)
E^( ~E)
:
9
Hence
E^

~E

V

aj ~E

= u(x1)E^(A1 \ ~E) +
mX
i=2
u(xi)
h
E^

Ai \ ~E

  E^

Ai 1 \ ~E
i
:
(1)
Now consider the decision at time t^: By denition, the (Choquet) expected utility
of any given act a is equal to V

ajE^

= u(x1)E^(A1) +
Pm
i=2 u(xi)

E^ (Ai)  E^ (Ai 1)

:
Assumption 2.3 implies E^ (A) =  (A) = (E) ; since  is convex it follows that E^ is
also convex. Lemma 2.1 implies that (1) may be rewritten as
X
~E2E ; ~EE^
(
u(x1)E^(A1 \ ~E) +
mX
i=2
u(xi)
h
E^

Ai \ ~E

  E^

Ai 1 \ ~E
i)
:
Thus V

ajE^

=
P
~E2E ; ~EE^ E^

~E

V

aj ~E

: A similar formula holds for the Cho-
quet integral of b: Since for all ~E 2 E ; ~E  E^; V

aj ~E

> V

bj ~E

; we have
V

ajE^

> V

bjE^

equivalently a <E^ b; which establishes dynamic consistency.
Remark 1 The strategy of the proof of 1)2 is similar to that of Theorem 3.1 in
Sarin and Wakker (1998). Some of the assumptions may be relaxed slightly. The proof
that 2)1 does not make use of the assumptions that utility is strongly monotonic or
continuous. The proof that 1)2 does not use convexity.
Remark 2 From the proof of Theorem 2.1 we can see that Lemma 2.1, which re-
quires beliefs to be represented by a convex capacity, is the most important step. The
following example demonstrates that this result is no longer true if we do not assume
convexity.
Example 2.1 Suppose there are two outcomes Win or Lose, where u (Win) = 1 >
0 = u (Lose). Consider a six element state space S=fs1; :::; s6g :
The ltration E on S is hfSg; ffs1; s3; s5g; fs2; s4; s6ggi. Consider a capacity  on S
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dened by:
 (fs1g) =  (fs2g) = 0:16;  (fsig) = 0:15 for i =2 f1; 2g :
 (fs1; s3g) =  (fs1; s5g) =  (fs2; s4g) =  (fs2; s6g) = 0:31;
 (fs3; s6g) =  (fs4; s5g) = 0:34;
 (fsi; sjg) = 0:32; otherwise.
 (fs1; s2; s3g) =  (fs2; s4; s6g) = 0:5;
 (fsi; sj ; skg) = 0:49 otherwise.
 (fsi; sj ; sk; s`g) = 0:68 for all i; j; k; l 2 f1; :::; 6g:
 (fsi; sj ; sk; s`; smg) = 0:84 for all i; j; k; l;m 2 f1; :::; 6g:
The set of admissible acts are bets on events of the form fsi; sjg, where (i+ j)mod 2 =
1. That is, the individual receives the outcome Win if a state from the event fsi; sjg
obtains, otherwise (s)he receives the outcome Lose.
Clearly, a maximal ex ante strategy is to make a bet on an event fsi; sjg, for
which i + j = 9. Now assume the decision-maker is allowed to make his/her bet on
a state in the element of the partition E1 = fOdd;Eveng, where Odd = fs1; s3; s5g;
Even = fs2; s4; s6g: By Assumption 2.3 the updated beliefs are given by:
Odd (fsig) =
8><>:
0:32 i = 1
0:30 i 2 f3; 5g ;
, Odd (fsi; sjg) =
8><>:
0:62 minfi; jg = 1
0:64 minfi; jg > 1;
Even (fsig) =
8><>:
0:32 i = 2
0:30 i 2 f4; 6g ;
, Even (fsi; sjg) =
8><>:
0:62 minfi; jg = 2
0:64 minfi; jg > 2:
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A maximal interim strategy measurable with respect to the partition E1 is, bet on s1
if Odd and bet on s2 if Even.
Here is a decision-maker who has CEU preferences with beliefs represented by a
capacity which satises  (fs1; s3; s5g)+ (fs2; s4; s6g) = 0:5+0:5 = 1. The updating
rule satises Assumption 2.3, yet a maximal ex ante plan must involve a bet on an
event fsi; sjg, for which i+ j = 9. But this is not dynamically consistent, since the
strategy which maximizes his updated CEU preferences involves betting on fs1g if
E = Odd and betting on fs2g if E = Even. Theorem 2.1 does not apply since the
capacity is not convex,
(fs1; s3; s5; s6g) + (fs2; s3; s4; s6g)  (fs3; s6g)
= 0:68 + 0:68  0:34 = 1:02
> 1 = (S) = (fs1; s3; s5; s6g [ fs2; s3; s4; s6g);
and so Lemma 2.1 does not hold. To see this note that  (fs3; s6g) = 0:34 but
 (fs3; s6g \Odd) +  (fs3; s6g \ Even) =  (fs3g) +  (fs6g) = 0:3:
3 Conclusion
One of the more common ways to model ambiguity-aversion is to use CEU preferences
with a convex capacity. This paper has found conditions under which such preferences
will be dynamically consistent. As we have shown dynamic consistency does impose
restrictions on CEU preferences. How acceptable these are would depend on the
particular application being considered. There are a number of ways in which we
could respond to this result.
We could relax dynamic consistency. There is very little experimental evidence
which supports the hypothesis that individuals are dynamically consistent. To be
convincing this approach would need to advance strong reasons why individuals might
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not mind apparent dynamic inconsistencies. Preliminary arguments along these lines
can be found in Kelsey and Milne (1999) and Wu (1999).
Another possible reaction is to replace CEU with a di¤erent model of ambiguity.
The leading contender is the multiple priors model, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
As shown in Sarin and Wakker (1998), dynamic consistency imposes a less stringent
restriction on the multiple priors model. Pires (2002) has axiomatised an updating
rule for such preferences.
If uncertainty is resolved over a period of time, individuals will typically not
be indi¤erent about the time at which uncertainty is resolved. This is related to
the issues discussed in the present paper. Grant, Kajii, and Polak (2000) found
that additivity over the nal partition was also su¢ cient for CEU preferences to
be information-loving. Wu (1999) has shown that a plausible model of preferences
concerning the resolution of uncertainty can lead to preferences of the CEU form.
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